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Abstract: Following an initiative of Social Choice and Welfare, this is the
result of an interview conducted by email exchange during the period from
July 2017 to February 2018, with minor adjustments later in 2018. Apart
from some personal history, topics discussed include: (i) social choice, es-
pecially with interpersonal comparisons of utility; (ii) utilitarianism, includ-
ing Harsanyi’s contributions; (iii) consequentialism in decision theory and
in ethics; (iv) the independence axiom for decisions under risk; (v) welfare
economics under uncertainty; (vi) incentive compatibility and strategy-proof
mechanisms, especially in large economies; (vii) Pareto gains from trade, and
from migration; (viii) cost–benefit analysis and welfare measurement; (ix) the
possible future of normative economics.
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Philippe Mongin (PM): The important contributions you made to social
choice theory, welfare economics, and social ethics are knit together by some
common theoretical ideas, which I would suggest we take up successively in
this discussion. I have selected in order, interpersonal comparisons of utility,
utilitarianism, consequentialism, welfare economics under uncertainty, and
incentive compatibility. Would you agree with this list and this order? What
could come first, however, is some kind of intellectual biography. Perhaps
you could explain to us how you first became interested in these topics and
how they permeated your later academic life.
Peter Hammond (PJH): Following your excellent overall plan, let us start
with how I became interested in social choice and welfare, as well as in their
application to public economics.
Actually, my interest in economics began in 1964 during the first year
of my studies in Cambridge for the Mathematics Tripos. I was at Trinity
Hall, where Geoff Harcourt was the Director of Studies for Economics. At
a tea party early that October, he asked me when I was going to switch to
economics, to which my reply was that I had no interest in doing so. But
soon after, the Labour Party won a general election, with Harold Wilson
succeeding Alec Douglas-Home as Prime Minister. The UK had a significant
balance of trade deficit, and the new government was faced with a sterling
crisis that Wilson blamed on the “gnomes of Zurich” — i.e., Swiss currency
speculators. Devaluation of the pound was forestalled for three years, but
that autumn I could not understand what I was reading in the newspapers
about currency speculation and the measures that might alleviate the deficit.
So I went into Heffer’s Paperback Bookshop to look for an economics book
I could afford, and bought the one which had the lowest price per page. This
happened to be Paul Samuelson’s Economics, his famous elementary text-
book, which I read during the Easter vacation in 1965. At about this time, a
college friend who knew of my interest in games such as chess and bridge, as
well as cricket and other ball games, recommended that I read a book he had
found in the library. This was another classic: von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Over the coming years I
remember occasional forays into some old-fashioned works on mathematical
economics such as that by R.G.D. Allen. There was also Ian Little’s Critique
of Welfare Economics which was too philosophical, I would guess, for my
untutored taste at that time.
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By 1966, I had several college friends studying for the Natural Sciences
Tripos who were tiring of spending every afternoon in a laboratory. In those
days, completing two years of Natural Sciences was enough for an honours
degree provided you did some “diligent study” during your third year. So
many of these friends switched to economics, and seemed to be enjoying it.
Accordingly, I applied for a government funded scholarship to start studying
economics myself in 1967/68, with a view to completing a Ph.D degree in
due course. My application was accepted, subject to not disgracing myself
in my final year Maths exams, which I just about managed. Nick Stern,
by the way, started along the same career path, though at a higher level of
achievement.
After spending the summer vacation of 1967 working for a software startup
company, my formal study of economics began that autumn. Cambridge of-
fered me the privilege of being able to attend lectures by distinguished aca-
demic economists such as Michael Farrell, who taught not only basic econo-
metrics but also the fundamental efficiency theorems of welfare economics,
based on the first of Tjalling Koopman’s Three Essays on the State of Eco-
nomic Science. David Champernowne taught statistics. There were also
Joan Robinson’s lectures on growth and capital accumulation, in the course
of which she taught us always to be clear about all our assumptions. Her
teaching and writings were the inspiration for my essay on the assumptions
of “contemporary neoclassical economic theology” (Hammond, 1989).
I also learned much from Christopher Bliss’s lectures on general equi-
librium theory, and even more from his weekly supervisions. After starting
with Keynes’ really difficult General Theory, Chris had asked me next to
read the much cited paper on the theory of second best by Lipsey and Lan-
caster (1956). He also hinted at feeling some dissatisfaction with it, and this
encouraged me to find a counter-example to Lipsey and Lancaster’s negative
conclusions in the case of, for example, limits to free trade based on quotas
rather than tariffs. Chris’s dissatisfaction arose, I suspect, because he was
aware of Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) work on optimal taxation, already
circulating in preprint form, which showed the desirability of production
efficiency even in a second-best world where one has to use distortionary
commodity taxes instead of first-best lump-sum redistribution.
The most important influence, however, was Jim Mirrlees. He gave lec-
tures on public economics that included ideas that emerged eventually in his
joint two-part paper with Peter Diamond on optimal taxation, as well as
other advanced lectures on optimal growth theory. After Mirrlees moved to
2
Oxford in 1968, that autumn I regularly attended mathematical economics
seminars there to which Jim had invited me. Robert Solow, who was visiting
Oxford at that time, was one of several prominent participants.1 With Jim’s
powers of persuasion over the other economics fellows of Nuffield College,
and Christopher Bliss’s strong encouragement, I moved there one year later.
Soon after I arrived in Oxford, Jim passed on some conjectures involving
an idea of his which helped resolve, in some special cases, the non-existence
of an optimal growth path for an infinite horizon. I suspect he already had a
clear idea of how to prove them, but I was encouraged to provide proofs any-
way. They became incorporated into our joint paper on “Agreeable Plans”
(Hammond and Mirrlees 1974). A few months later, Jim presented this to
an IEA conference on Economic Growth, held during 1970 in Jerusalem,
whose proceedings later appeared in the conference volume (Mirrlees and
Stern 1974). Eventually agreeable plans were the subject of a considerable
part of my Cambridge Ph.D. thesis on Consistent Planning and Intertemporal
Welfare Economics (Hammond 1973).
PM: Concerning our first topic, interpersonal comparisons of utility
(ICUs), you stated that social choice theory would not have developed fruit-
fully (and would have remained a “science of the impossible”, as you once
wrote) if it had remained at the stage of Arrow’s social welfare function
(SWF), which excludes collective preferences that rely on ICUs (Hammond
1987b). Two papers of yours (Hammond 1976a and 1979b) modify the SWF
concept to allow for comparisons of welfare levels and axiomatize concepts of
equity in the Rawlsian sense. In later discussions, you consider other ways
of introducing ICUs, for instance Sen’s social welfare functionals, which per-
mit enlarging the scope of ICUs beyond mere level comparisons. Here again,
we could make a historical start and begin with the way your ideas on ICUs
developed in the 1970s, when social choice theory began reconfiguring Arrow’s
work.
PJH: While in Oxford, Jim Mirrlees asked me to look at the typescript
version of what became Prasanta Pattanaik’s book Voting and Collective
Choice (Pattanaik 1971), which he had submitted to support his application
for a senior research fellowship at Nuffield. It was a pleasure to read. Occa-
sionally I would have a question, only to find it clearly answered in the next
paragraph. Prasanta arrived at Nuffield during the academic year 1970/71,
1Some years after the 25th anniversary of this seminar, Michael Bacharach, Michael
Dempster, and John Enos together edited a celebratory online volume.
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and gave a weekly lecture on social choice theory there. The focus was defi-
nitely on Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values (Arrow, 1963) which I
understood much better after attending Prasanta’s lectures. Prasanta, per-
haps influenced by meeting Allan Gibbard at Harvard, also introduced me
to the idea of strategic voting (Gibbard 1973) and to Yasusuke Murakami’s
Logic and Social Choice (Murakami, 1968). He also mentioned a monotonic-
ity condition for sincere voting somewhat like Arrow’s positive association.
This had some resemblance to the monotonicity condition that Eric Maskin
later made famous — see Dasgupta et al. (1979) and Maskin (1999).
My two years in Oxford also offered me the opportunity to meet for the
first time some other prominent academics such as Amartya Sen and Joe
Stiglitz, as well as the political scientist Brian Barry. I was also a friend of
Iain McLean, another political scientist, who has since produced some fine
work on the early history of social choice theory (MacLean and Hewitt 1994;
MacLean and Urken 1995). In 1971, after my own two-year junior research
fellowship at Nuffield had ended, I had the privilege of joining Christopher
Bliss and Tony Atkinson at the University of Essex, where they had been
recruited after Richard Lipsey and other founders of the Economics Depart-
ment there had moved on. Essex is also where I first met Kevin Roberts,
whose exceptional promise was already clear while he was completing his
B.A. degree in mathematical economics.
Anyway, in the autumn of 1971 I read Amartya Sen’s important book
Collective Choice and Social Welfare (Sen 1970a). I had already seen his
Econometrica paper on interpersonally comparable utilities, in which I found
a minor mistake, duly acknowledged and corrected shortly thereafter (Sen
1970c, 1972b). I was prompted to start reading the books by Richard Hare
(1952, 1963, 1981), the noted Oxford philosopher, and discovering his major
thesis that ethics was about universalizable prescriptive statements. And
chapters 9 and 9* in Sen (1970a) usefully elaborate the key idea of an ex-
tended preference ordering over the Cartesian product of ordered pairs (x, i)
that combine a social state x with an individual i. The idea of considering
such pairs had already been taken up somewhat informally in the second edi-
tion of Social Choice and Individual Values (Arrow, 1963) (under the name
“extended sympathy”), and more formally by Patrick Suppes (1966). In
the case of two pairs (x, i) and (y, j) where individuals i and j differ, any
preference between the two involves an ICU.
By my third year as a Lecturer at Essex, I had finally submitted my Ph.D.
thesis (Hammond 1973). Before the examiners Terence (W.M.) Gorman and
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Geoffrey Heal passed it in 1974, Essex also granted me tenure as a Lecturer,
which was possible in those days. During that academic year 1973/74, I
was also allowed to teach a master’s course in public economics. From the
work of Diamond, Mirrlees, Atkinson, Dasgupta, Stiglitz and others, not to
mention optimal growth theory, I had got used to writing down a utilitarian
Bergson social welfare function to represent the objective of economic policy.
Yet Arrow’s theorem seemed to have converted politics from Bismarck’s “art
of the possible” to the “science of the impossible”, to use the phrase in
Hammond (1987b) that you have kindly recalled. I was also aware of John
Rawls’ Theory of Justice, and even his prior article on “Justice as Fairness”
(Rawls 1958, 1971).
Several discussions and even criticisms of Arrow’s theorem up to the early
1970s had focused on his condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). This condition, which excludes the Borda rule and other similar SWFs
based on rank order, is indeed crucially important, but it may not be the
root of why avoiding dictatorship seemed so difficult. Chapters 9 and 9* of
Sen (1971) suggest that if one is to arrive at a non-dictatorial solution, in
particular a Rawlsian maximin social ordering, or any basic notion of equity,
the first thing to do is to add more information in the form of an extended
preference ordering. Alternatively, a social welfare functional (SWFL), in
the sense also explained in Sen’s book, can embody this extra information.
This information is compatible with a modified form of IIA, something like
“independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons”, to use the title of one
of my later papers (Hammond 1991b), or to be more precise, “independence
of interpersonal comparisons involving irrelevant alternatives”. The Rawlsian
maximin and its leximin extension satisfy this new version of IIA, but of
course other axioms were needed for it to be fully characterized.
One of these axioms, whose role is to arrive at an equitable rule rather
than the inequitable alternative of maximax, came to be known in the liter-
ature as “Hammond equity”. It is the key postulate of the paper Hammond
(1979b) which you kindly mentioned, with its improved characterizations of
both Rawlsian maximin and leximin. The idea, however, is essentially al-
ready set out in Sen’s short book On Economic Inequality (Sen 1973), if
not in the earlier works of Pigou (1920) and Dalton (1920) claiming that
progressive income transfers from rich to poor would increase social welfare.
I was fortunate that some preprint version of my 1976 paper had come
to Ken Arrow’s attention. The result was that, along with related work by
Steven Strasnick (1976) and the more general ideas of Claude d’Aspremont
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and Louis Gevers (1977), it was cited in an American Economic Association
Papers and Proceedings issue (Arrow 1977). Arrow was right to recall the
logical link to his own discussion of “extended sympathy”.
PM: As you just mentioned, d’Aspremont and Gevers were among the
important contributors of these years. Their 1977 article offers a joint char-
acterization of leximin and utilitarianism (D’Aspremont and Gevers 1977).
To emphasize the duality of these rules is typical of the Belgian school of
social choice; this comes out even more clearly in a paper (Deschamps and
Gevers 1978) which shows that their axioms leave essentially no choice beside
leximin and utilitarianism. Perhaps you could briefly assess this alternative
treatment of leximin?
PJH: Thank you indeed for reminding me of this important piece of
research. Louis Gevers in particular was a good friend who was lost to
us far too early. To be frank, I regarded two papers that Kevin Roberts
(1980a, b) published in the same issue of the Review of Economic Studies
as the culmination of the work during the 1970s on ICUs and their role
in SWFLs. One of the lessons which emerged was that there are many
ways of avoiding Arrow’s impossibility theorem once one introduces the extra
information required to make ICUs. It is nice to have appealing axioms that
reduce the possibilities to a choice between leximin and utilitarianism. How
to make this final choice, however, seems to require some deeper principles
that, amongst others, I have explored in more recent work.
PM: Now that we have discussed the rediscovery of ICUs by social choice
theorists and your role in it, I would like to ask you about some of their the-
oretical underpinnings. Obviously, you regard them as being meaningful and
feasible, unlike the new welfare economists, and at least in a common inter-
pretation, Arrow himself, but your 1991 survey (Hammond, 1991a) stresses
that their empirical and ethical significance is often unclear. I wonder how
this scepticism is compatible both with your early work on equity and your
later endorsement of utilitarianism.
PJH: First, I should probably try to clear up a common misunderstand-
ing. It is that Lionel Robbins wrote that economists should not make inter-
personal comparisons of utility. But what he actually wrote, at least in his
later comment (Robbins 1938), was that such comparisons lack “scientific
foundations”. One interpersonal comparison that I have made in writing is
that the few extra euros that a rich person might spend on a better bottle of
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wine are worth less than the same amount of money that a poor mother might
spend on medicine that could save the life of her desperately sick child. Such
a comparison is not purely factual; it has significant ethical content precisely
because it crosses the divide between facts and values that British philoso-
phers know as Hume’s Law. Thus, I agree with Robbins when he writes that
ICUs are “more like judgments of value than judgments of verifiable fact”.
Sen’s framework of SWFLs had played such a key constructive role in
the developments of the 1970s. Nevertheless, by the time of my 1991 selec-
tive survey of ICUs and their use in social choice and welfare economics, I
was becoming increasingly disenchanted with this framework. I think that
my disquiet became even clearer when preparing my conference talk (Ham-
mond 1996) that emerged later as “Consequentialist Decision Theory and
Utilitarian Ethics”. The part of Sen’s framework — which I was also using
for at least a decade — that I was questioning concerned his treatment of
individuals’ utility functions as somehow basic, with comparisons of different
individuals’ utility functions added on as some sort of superstructure. Yet
in the original position arguments used by Vickrey and Harsanyi, a person’s
utility is really just an estimate of the expected ethical value of becoming
that individual upon emerging from what Rawls (1971) later called the “veil
of ignorance”.
Now, my favourite approach to constructing a utilitarian social objective
is one that extends Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator”, who judges the
welfare of single individuals, to an impartial benefactor who makes decisions
for society as a whole. In this approach, it turns out that the most useful
concept of individual utility is one that builds in social choice in original
positions right from the start. Indeed, it seems best to consider “general-
ized” original positions with different specified hypothetical probabilities of
becoming different individuals in society, as well as decision problems where
even these hypothetical probabilities can be chosen.
PM: You just described two theoretical moves, one away from Sen’s social
welfare functionals, and a move towards utilitarianism. The two moves are
of course logically distinct. Is it a biographical accident that you made these
two moves simultaneously, or is there a deeper reason?
PJH: Well, Rawls introduced a different concept of the original position
when arguing for his “difference principle”, leading to the maximin or leximin
SWFL. Of course Harsanyi (1974) famously criticized this as an inappropriate
way of making decisions in the original position. Harsanyi maintained that,
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in the original position, one should maximize expected utility. The work I
have done on rational choice reflects me to agree with Harsanyi here, though
I do want to use a different concept of utility.
PM: Another possible line about ICUs is that they are not the only pos-
sible interpersonal comparisons to make if one is to assess economic states
of affairs. In a 2001 survey of ICUs written with Fleurbaey, you raise the
question “interpersonal comparisons of what?” (Fleurbaey and Hammond,
2004). Relatedly, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, 2017) have thoroughly ex-
plored equity criteria based on the mere knowledge of the indifference curves,
a direction that, as Fleurbaey and I later found out (in Fleurbaey and Mon-
gin, 2005), had already been taken by welfare economists whose work was
obfuscated by Arrow’s and Sen’s successes. Could you possibly comment on
this typical example of interpersonal comparisons that are not of utility? And
perhaps also say what you think of its prolonged dismissal by social choice
theory?
PJH: The Handbook of Utility Theory that I co-edited with Salvador
Barbera` and Christian Seidl needed a chapter on ICUs. Yet I did not want
merely to repeat what I had done in 1991. So I was very happy when Marc
Fleurbaey agreed to join me as a co-author of the relevant chapter (Fleurbaey
and Hammond 2004). The title “Interpersonally Comparable Utility” was
carefully chosen with the intention of conveying the message that, rather
than seeing ICUs as comparing different components of an independently
constructed profile of individual utility functions, it might be better to think
of this profile as being constructed right from the start so that it is “interper-
sonally comparable”, with the eventual use of those comparisons in a social
ordering very much in mind.
Before assessing the thought provoking contributions of Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2011, 2017), let us first go back to the work on SWFLs during the
1970s. D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) proved that if a SWFL satisfies the
conditions of unrestricted domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and Pareto indifference, then it must be welfarist — i.e., in a society of n
individuals, one can represent it by a single preference ordering over the n-
dimensional Euclidean space of vectors of personal welfare levels. Roberts
(1980b) formulated a similar result that uses only the weak Pareto condition,
though as I pointed out later (Hammond, 1999b), his “weak continuity”
assumption needs some slight strengthening to a condition I called “pairwise
continuity”. Anyway a welfarist SWFL, by definition, can use information
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only about welfare levels. This forces the ICUs to be independent of other
considerations such as fairness. Kaplow and Shavell (2001, 2002, 2003), in
their book and associated articles, offer a rather more contentious version of
a similar point — namely, that imposing a condition like fairness is likely to
violate the Pareto principle if one remains within a welfarist framework.
Now, social choice theorists have generally invoked an assumption such
as an unrestricted domain of finite decision trees, or at least a sufficiently
unrestricted domain. This plays a crucial role in those old justifications
of welfarism. My own arguments for utilitarianism also put no restrictions
on the impartial benefactor’s judgements regarding the expected utility as-
cribed to the different personal consequences faced by each individual in the
original position. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, 2017), however, consider
restricted domains of social choice problems such as those that involve di-
viding an aggregate bundle of several different commodities among a set of
individuals. They consider social choice procedures which select allocations
that maximize a Paretian welfare ordering which, as with Arrow social wel-
fare functions, depends only on the individuals’ preference orderings. Unlike
Arrow, however, they not only consider a restricted domain of social choice
problems, but they also relax independence of (preferences for) irrelevant
alternatives. This allows their procedure to generate fair rather than dic-
tatorial allocations. The various notions of fairness that they consider do
depend on interpersonal comparisons of utility levels, of course, and these
comparisons can take irrelevant alternatives into account. It is an interesting
alternative to welfarist rules like utilitarianism.
Nevertheless, I cannot help wondering how well the kind of procedure
they consider would perform in a dynamic or multi-period setting. After
all, there can then be continuation sub-problems. In these, dependence on
alternatives that have become irrelevant because they are no longer feasible
may create difficulties of the kind discussed in my paper on “metastatic”
choice (Hammond 1977). The difficulty is illustrated by the sensitivity of the
Borda rule, or similar ranking rules, to the feasible set of options to which it is
applied. It is also somewhat similar to the difficulties created in decision trees
when an individual seeks to maximize a preference ordering which violates
the independence axiom and which therefore may be represented by some
“non-expected” utility function (Hammond 1988a, b).
Let us return, however, to the vexed question of whether maximizing the
sum of individuals’ expected utilities is somehow inimical to equity. This
is what Peter Diamond (1967a) argued in his famous comment on John
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Harsanyi (1955). Obviously considering only total utility pays no atten-
tion to its distribution between different individuals. This neglect would
have worried John Rawls even more than Peter Diamond, I suppose. But
this valid criticism does not imply that a utilitarian is committed to ignore
equity.
Before explaining this, it may be useful to consider some of Amartya Sen’s
other writings, apart from those that introduced the notion of an SWFL.
Notably, he introduced rights into social choice theory (Sen 1970b). He
also put forward the concepts of “capabilities and functionings” as what I
would regard as important components of an ethically satisfactory notion
of individual well-being (Sen 1985). Now, apart from any concern over the
proliferation of concepts, there is one other worry, which I have written about
in the case of rights (Hammond 1997). This is the thought that rights should
matter only to the extent that they benefit the individuals who have them.
But then, if rights really are beneficial, should they not be included in an
appropriate measure of individual well-being that an impartial benefactor
should be using? Pushing this idea far enough suggests that, despite our
concern for fairness, we might still want to follow utilitarians at least to the
extent of considering only utility, suitably measured, as well as interpersonal
comparisons that are restricted to ICUs.
This brings us at last to my main point regarding Fleurbaey and Mani-
quet, and their new concepts of equity that you mention. Let us first rec-
ognize that as one increases the impartial benefactor’s “consequence risk
aversion” in the relevant original position, in optimal distribution problems
that will tend to increase equality among first-best levels of utility. But our
ethics may still suggest that there should be more equality than the level of
consequence risk aversion on its own implies. In this case it may be more
appropriate to emulate the treatment of rights suggested above, and include
some measure of equity, reflecting possibly equality of both outcomes and
opportunities, among each relevant consequence that affects individual wel-
fare. Essentially the same idea has been discussed by, amongst others, John
Broome (1990, 1991) and Mark Machina (1989). This line of argument re-
minds me, however, of Arrow’s own “non-imposition” condition, as stated
in his original “A Difficulty” paper, as well as subsequently in the first edi-
tion of Social Choice and Individual Values (Arrow 1950, 1951a). Overall,
I am led to wonder if we should not refuse to give any special treatment to
social desiderata such as equity or respect for rights unless we deem them
to be inherently desirable for individuals. But in this case having more of
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these desiderata should increase any ethically relevant measure of individual
“well-being” or utility.2
PM: It is perhaps time to move on to the related questions of utilitari-
anism. When it comes to this, you offer both formal derivations and a philo-
sophical endorsement. I see two main treatments, one you gave in 1982 and
1983 in connection with the ex ante versus ex post question, to be discussed
later, and another from 1992, which I am focusing on now (Hammond, 1982,
1983, 1992). This latter treatment is essentially the same as Harsanyi’s; he
is the theorist who perhaps had most influence on your work. You encapsu-
late an application of Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem in a decision-theoretic
framework of your own, but if this theorem has no ethical relevance, as Sen
and others have complained, how would justify your more complex construc-
tion? Do you not think that you should defend Harsanyi in the first place?
PJH: You are surely right in remarking that Harsanyi is the theorist
who had most influence on my utilitarian views. Indeed, Amartya Sen once
chided me (rather mildly) for my “dangerous fascination with Harsanyi”.
Quite late in life, Harsanyi did not demur when I suggested that a route to
rule utilitarianism, which of course he strongly endorsed, might pass through
some concept of “rule consequences”, appropriately defined.
But let me now turn to your question regarding Harsanyi’s aggregation
theorem, and the criticisms of Harsanyi’s version of utilitarianism that Sen
and Pattanaik, amongst others, have made of it — criticisms, by the way, that
Harsanyi seemed unaware of when Claude d’Aspremont and I interviewed
him in Caen for Social Choice and Welfare (D’Aspremont and Hammond
2001). This is rather surprising unless one recognizes that this could have
been an early sign of the illness that eventually took him from us. When I
was asked to contribute to the volume of Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi
that his friend and co-author Reinhard Selten was editing, I chose to offer
an alternative proof of the aggregation theorem using the theory of linear
programming, and did not provide anything more than the briefest reference
to my criticisms of his version of utilitarianism (Hammond 1992).
2Recently, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2018, p. 1031) seem to recognize this possibility
when they write as follows: “Note that our defense of the social welfare function could
even be understood as a defense of the utilitarian approach, for an ecumenical notion of
utilitarianism that is flexible about the degree of inequality aversion and the definition of
individual utility.”
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In discussing Harsanyi’s concept of utility, however, let us begin with
William Vickrey. In barely one — breathlessly long — sentence on page 329
of Vickrey (1945), he imagines the case where each individual has their own
VNM utility function, and the benevolent (or beneficent?) social planner is
asked to maximize the expected value of an even chance lottery whose risky
states of the world correspond to the individuals in the society. Vickrey,
after all, was interested in measuring the marginal utility of income, or more
precisely, the marginal rate of substitution between different individual’s in-
comes. So for him, each individual’s VNM utility function depends only on
observable “objective” circumstances such as income, educational qualifica-
tions, date of birth, marital status, etc. One sentence, however, did not offer
Vickrey the scope to explore in any depth the ethical foundation of the in-
dividuals’ VNM utility functions — though he did take up the subject again
in his paper on “social decision rules” (Vickrey, 1960). This foundation is
what Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1976, 1977) attempted to provide.
An obvious difficulty is that each individual really has at best a unique
cardinal equivalence class of VNM utility functions — equivalence mean-
ing being related by an increasing affine transformation, so that ratios of
utility differences represent constant marginal rates of substitution between
appropriate probability shifts. As Pattanaik (1968) in particular has pointed
out, even if one fixes for each individual one particular VNM utility func-
tion within their own cardinal equivalence class, these functions will typically
have to be weighted before being added. Mathematically, this is identical to
the problem that arises in extending the Savage (1954) and, perhaps more
precisely, the Anscombe–Aumann (1961) theory of subjective probability and
subjective expected utility (SEU) to the case when there is a separate con-
sequence domain associated with each state of the world. In my FUR 1997
conference paper (Hammond 1999a) on state-independent utility on state-
dependent consequence domains, I show that this problem can be resolved
if one contemplates decision problems where the agent can choose the prob-
abilities of the different states of the world. Similarly, I think the Harsanyi
problem can be resolved by contemplating the choice of generalized original
positions with different probabilities of becoming different individuals in the
society.
Another weakness of Harsanyi’s approach, and of Vickrey’s too, I suppose,
comes back to my doubt that one should start by postulating a given profile
of individual utility functions, rather than deriving them from suitable ethical
decision problems as we try to do in Chichilnisky et al. (2018).
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PM: Am I correct in saying that this amounts to vindicating Harsanyi’s
Impartial Observer Theorem, as against the Aggregation Theorem we just
discussed?
PJH: What I am trying to vindicate is his use of an original position and
of a VNM utility function in that position in order to arrive at the ethical
decision criterion of what Harsanyi called the “impartial observer”, though
perhaps one should think instead of a more active “impartial benefactor”.
While we are discussing Harsanyi, perhaps I may mention another signif-
icant disagreement I have with him, which concerns his view that population
should be chosen to maximize average utility per head of population. Both
in my Ph.D. thesis and the later Social Choice and Welfare paper on con-
sequentialist demographic norms (Hammond 1973, 1988c), I have criticized
this criterion as yielding dynamically inconsistent preferences — unless, that
is, you keep track of the entire population of humanity all the way back to
the origin of homo sapiens. Though one wonders if even this is far enough
back given recently discovered DNA evidence that our ancestors interbred
with Neanderthals, who in turn interbred with Denisovans. Anyway, with an
obvious assumption that the unchangeable welfare of long forgotten ances-
tors should be irrelevant to contemporary decisions, one returns to classical
total utilitarianism. This is even compatible with a version of the Vickrey–
Harsanyi original position, where one must reckon with some possibility of
never coming into existence. Here, by the way, I like to define zero utility
as the level ascribed to any person who never comes into existence. This
differs from Chuck Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson who, in
their book Population Issues in Social Choice Theory as well as in several
earlier research articles, prefer to use a “critical” utility level (Blackorby et
al. 2005).
To sum up, in the end I do not really feel any need to defend Harsanyi.
But I am very happy to acknowledge being greatly inspired by his (and Vick-
rey’s) appreciation of the importance of using VNM theory in a fundamental
way in order first to construct an interpersonally comparable measure of
utility, and then to compare social states based on their expected utilities
in suitable even chance lotteries. Also, Harsanyi’s (1974) famous criticism
of Rawls’s view of the decision-maker’s extreme risk aversion in the original
position remains very much to the point, as well as the subject of Hammond
(1975b) on “extreme inequality aversion”.
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Finally, I found myself wanting to refute the claim in Myerson (1985)
that “interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be given decision theoretic
significance”. So, in our Handbook chapter on “Interpersonally Comparable
Utility” (Fleurbaey and Hammond 2004), we refer to Harsanyi (1987), which
opens with the example of choosing which friend should receive an opera
ticket one could not use.
PM: If I may linger on the issues here, Harsanyi’s utilitarian interpreta-
tion of his two theorems runs into two separate difficulties. One is the mean-
ingfulness of the weights in the weighted sum of individual VNM utilities that
both theorems derive, and the other is the very choice of VNM utilities to rep-
resent individual preferences that are ordinal in nature. Your answer seems
to address the former problem, but not the latter, which critics usually regard
as being the more worrying. I believe like you that an Anscombe–Aumann re-
construction of the original position may fix the weights — I think each of us
has made the point independently — but this takes the VNM representation
for granted, so the other problem is still on the table.
PJH: If I understand correctly, you made the point about fixing the
weights in Mongin (2001). By contrast, in our recent working paper (Chi-
chilnisky et al. 2018), Graciela Chichilnisky, Nick Stern and I actually cir-
cumvent the state-dependence issue involved in fixing the welfare weights in
the original position. We do so by postulating an all-encompassing domain
of personal consequences, each of which represents a possible individual life
experience, including the possibility of no life at all. This is instead of each
individual having their own specific personal consequence domain.
Our formulation allows us to treat ethical decision problems where the
number of individuals, as well as their personal characteristics, are risky and
affected by the decision being made. Such problems can then include even
the hypothetical choice of a partial or biased original position, which implies
interpersonal comparisons.
Given the relevant risks, it is natural to use what Serge Kolm (1971,
1994) might call a “fundamental” VNM utility function defined over this
all-encompassing domain. An additional equity axiom inspired by Patrick
Suppes’ famous paper on grading principles (Suppes 1966) then suggests
that, when an impartial benefactor is choosing a world history rather than an
original position, it is right to use an unbiased or impartial original position
that takes into account the probability of a person coming into existence.
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PM: The decision-theoretic framework involved in our interchange is con-
sequentialism, which we may discuss now. Among moral philosophers, this
word applies to those doctrines which define the rightness of an act from the
value of its consequences. In your work, especially in your reference article
(Hammond 1988a), it both applies to an axiomatic reconstruction of decision
theory and appears as one salient axiom in this reconstruction. Could I ask
you to recapitulate the reconstruction and clarify the semantic connection
between your consequentialism and that of the philosophers?
PJH: Let me precede an answer, if I may, with some more personal
background. I have already mentioned attending Joan Robinson’s lectures
on economic theory that she gave in Cambridge during the 1967/8 academic
year. Most likely inspired by an argument from Jan Graaff’s book Theoretical
Welfare Economics, she once pointed out that a difficulty with long-range
planning was how to specify the horizon (Graaff 1957). The point is that,
however far away the chosen horizon may be, it will eventually be reached,
whereupon one will be forced to revise one’s original plan. I remember raising
my hand and suggesting that recent work on infinite-horizon planning that I
had learned about from Mirrlees’ lectures showed a possible way round this
objection. This interchange does much to explain why Consistent Planning
and Intertemporal Welfare Economics became the title of my Ph.D. thesis
(Hammond 1973), with several of its later chapters devoted to infinite-horizon
planning models.
Sometime during the years 1969–71 that I spent at Nuffield College, Gra-
ham Pyatt recommended to me the classic paper on myopia and inconsis-
tency by Robert Strotz (1956). Also, at the 1970 World Congress of the
Econometric Society in Cambridge, Chuck Blackorby gave a talk in which,
according to my possibly imperfect recall, showed that a consumer who max-
imizes inconsistent preferences at different times will have intertemporal de-
mand functions that violate the Slutsky conditions for consistent preference
maximization.3 That work helped inspire my “Changing Tastes and Coher-
ent Dynamic Choice” (Hammond 1976b), which made a similar point in the
framework of choice functions over finite sets that Arrow had used in his 1959
Economica article (Arrow 1959). I had also become aware of the concluding
part of the second edition of Arrow’s book (Arrow 1963), which set out to
justify the collective rationality postulate built into his definition of a SWF.
3The published paper (Blackorby et al. 1973) uses a different approach to demonstrate
inconsistency of demand behaviour.
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His argument was based on an informal version of the path independence
postulate that, in the theory of revealed preference, plays a role in ensuring
the integrability of consumer demand functions. Meanwhile, probably while
still in Oxford, my supervisor Mirrlees introduced me to the money pump
argument, which typically neglects the likely effect of decreasing wealth on an
agent’s willingness to pay for each successive preferred alternative. Anyway,
I was encouraged to look for a better argument in favour of transitivity.
Then, in 1974/5 at the Australian National University, I suddenly real-
ized that I could offer a different justification for collective rationality, and for
transitive preferences more generally. It drew some inspiration from Vick-
rey’s 1964 book Metastatics and Macreconomics, which emphasized that,
especially after Debreu’s Theory of Value, much of economic theory treated
the consumer as if making a single life-long consumption plan subject to just
one life-time budget constraint (Vickrey 1964, Debreu 1959). As I now see it,
this formulation reflects von Neumann’s assertion that a game in extensive
form could be fully analysed by considering only the normal form, in which
each player is restricted to making a single strategy choice (Von Neumann
1928). In the book with Morgenstern, this normal or reduced form of the
game is described as one where each player’s only move is to announce in
private to an umpire the strategy that the umpire should execute on the
player’s behalf (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). This general claim
that only the normal form matters is valid, I believe, only in a few special
cases. One concerns single-person decision problems, and so team decision
problems as well. A second concerns the two-person “zero-sum” (or “strictly
competitive”) games that were really the only ones that von Neumann was
able to solve satisfactorily.
Now, my work on changing tastes showed that, except in trivial cases, this
reduction to the normal form does not work when an agent has dynamically
inconsistent preferences. In fact, it works for all finite decision trees if and
only if the decision-maker has preferences for paths through each tree that are
consistent and also transitive. Moreover, in the case of a social decision tree,
an Arrow SWF allows such a reduction if and only if IIA is satisfied. Inspired
by Vickrey (1964), I chose the title “Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic
Choice” for this first paper (Hammond 1977).
So far there had been no attempt to include risk or uncertainty in this
approach to decision theory. The next stage comes in a paper that was never
published. It bore a title something like “Some Uncomfortable Options in
Welfare Economics under Uncertainty”. An egalitarian welfare economist like
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myself, particularly after enjoying the experience of being Tony Atkinson’s
colleague for several years, might like to see as equal a distribution of income
as possible, taking into account various incentive constraints. The paper on
“Fully Progressive Taxation” written with Partha Dasgupta helped explore
what might be possible (Dasgupta and Hammond 1980). Once one intro-
duced risk and different personal probabilities, however, an ex ante Pareto
efficient allocation that started out egalitarian would only be egalitarian ex
post in rare circumstances. I was uneasy about this evident dynamic incon-
sistency between ex ante and ex post.
In 1980 Maurice Salles invited several of us to a conference he had or-
ganized with Prasanta Pattanaik to be held in Caen, immediately after the
World Congress of the Econometric Society in Aix-en-Provence. Indeed, this
meeting led eventually to the founding of Social Choice and Welfare as the
leading specialist journal. My plan had been to present my “Uncomfortable
Options” paper. But while travelling from Aix to Caen, I suddenly realized
that the main idea of “Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice” (Ham-
mond 1977) could be applied to decision trees with chance nodes, where it
would imply the independence axiom. That led to a significantly revised
conference paper emphasizing that dynamic consistency would require an ex
post approach (Hammond 1983). The idea of calling this “consequentialist”
decision theory only came a few years later.
After these perhaps rather lengthy preliminaries, let us now turn to the
paper which you asked me about (Hammond 1988a). A paper, by the way,
that had been prepared while I was visiting CORE in 1986, to which you very
kindly invited me back to give some lectures on this topic in 1994. Anyway,
it might actually be better to go a bit further forward to “Consequentialism,
Structural Rationality and Game Theory”, which appeared in the proceed-
ings of a 1993 conference of the International Economic Association that Ken
Arrow co-organized (Hammond 1996a). The later paper may offer a rather
clearer statement of consequentialist decision theory, based on three axioms
applied to finite decision trees in a specified domain. For simplicity, let us
focus first on the case of finite decision trees without risk or uncertainty.
Then there is no need to discuss chance nodes at which what Anscombe and
Aumann (1963) call a “roulette lottery” is resolved, nor “natural” or “event”
nodes at which a “horse lottery” is resolved.
Of these three axioms, the first is that the theory applies on an unre-
stricted domain — or at least a domain that is sufficiently unrestricted to
accommodate the trees that are used in the proof that choice must maximize
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a (complete and transitive) preference ordering. Indeed, a decision theory
whose scope must be limited to a restricted domain of finite decision trees
seems evidently insufficient, just as majority rule is in the context of social
choice theory.
To explain the second and third axioms, it may be best to introduce a
little notation. Given any finite decision tree T and any decision node n of T ,
let M(T, n) denote the non-empty set of moves that are feasible at n, and
let M∗(T, n) denote the set of moves at node n which our decision theory
deems normatively acceptable. Since indecision at node n is not an option,
as Arrow (1951a) lucidly explained in his thesis, the set M∗(T, n) must be
a non-empty subset of M(T, n). We also let T (n) denote the continuation
subtree of T that starts at its initial node n. This is the result of “snipping
off” T (n) from T , to use the evocative terminology of Machina (1989).
Now, the second axiom is dynamic consistency. Using the notation we
have just introduced, this requires that the set M∗(T, n) of acceptable moves
at node n in the tree T should be the same as the set M∗(T (n), n) of accept-
able moves at the initial node of the continuation subtree T (n). This equality
can be made almost tautological by recognizing that any earlier plans of what
to do when the decision maker reaches node n are essentially irrelevant by the
time n has been reached, so it is M∗(T (n), n) that determines what the agent
will actually do at node n. Thus, if we define M∗(T, n) as the set of moves
that the agent might actually make at node n, it must equal M∗(T (n), n).
Though I find this consistency axiom entirely compelling, in a talk I gave in
2017 to the conference of the European Society for the History of Economic
Thought, I set out to replace it by one requiring that the agent should never
face any possibility whatsoever of regretting her original decision plan.
The third axiom is intended to express Arrow’s claim that an act should
be judged by its consequences (Arrow 1951b). It also conforms with Sav-
age’s definition of an act as a mapping from states of the world to their
consequences (Savage 1954). This “consequentialist” axiom is the one that
does by far the most work, so I felt free to base the name of this approach
to normative decision theory on this axiom. Indeed, I would rather call it a
“pre-axiom”, from which so many axioms in other versions of normative de-
cision theory follow as logical implications. Given any finite decision tree T ,
one can use backward recursion to construct at each successive decision node
n of T : first, the set F (T, n) of all possible consequences that can result ul-
timately from choosing any move from the feasible set M(T, n); second, the
set F ∗(T ) of all “acceptable” consequences that can result ultimately from
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choosing any acceptable move from M∗(T, n). Evidently each F ∗(T, n) is
always a non-empty subset of the corresponding F (T, n), as one can prove
by backward induction. What the “consequentialist” axiom requires is the
existence of a choice function mapping non-empty finite subsets F of the
consequence domain Y into non-empty choice subsets C(F ) with the prop-
erty that, for any finite decision tree T , one has F ∗(T, n) = C(F (T, n)) at
every decision node n. Thus, the agent must behave in any decision tree as
if a planned sequence of moves, or “decision strategy”, can be chosen if and
only if it has acceptable consequences. This “consequentialist” axiom is the
application to single-person decision trees of von Neumann’s principle that
we discussed earlier — namely, the claim that it loses no generality to reduce
a game in extensive form to its normal form (Von Neumann 1928).
The main result of this consequentialist approach to normative decision
theory is that the three axioms hold if and only if the consequence choice
function which maps each non-empty finite feasible set F to the non-empty
choice set C(F ) ⊆ F is ordinal. That is, there must be a complete and
transitive preference ordering defined on the consequence domain Y such that
the consequence choice set F ∗(T, n) = C(F (T, n)) at any decision node n in
any finite decision tree T corresponds to choosing consequences to maximize
that ordering over the finite feasible set F (T, n).
PM: This is a very helpful summary. Perhaps you could now extend it to
the case of chance nodes, which permits deriving a preference ordering that
satisfies the VNM independence condition. As you take this logical derivation
also to be a normative justification of this notorious condition, it has led to
a lively controversy with Machina.
PJH: Where Mark Machina and I differ is indeed in the extension of
the above consequentialist theory to decision trees with chance nodes. In
those trees, the preference ordering is over consequence lotteries. The key
axiom that F ∗(T ) = C(F (T )) would actually imply universal indifference if
we were to allow random moves at chance nodes to have zero probability, so
we do not allow this. Perhaps I may be allowed to mention here two papers
(Hammond 1999b, c) I wrote that allow infinitesimal probabilities at chance
nodes, building on my contribution to the Festschrift for Patrick Suppes, the
“scientific philosopher” (Hammond 1994a).
Once we exclude both zero and infinitesimal probabilities, however, the
existence of a preference ordering satisfying the independence axiom is neces-
sary and, when combined with continuity with respect to changes in probabil-
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ities at chance nodes, sufficient for the preference ordering to be represented
by the expected value of each utility function in a non-empty equivalence
class. According to my possible misinterpretation of how his work differs
from mine, Mark chose to deny what I call dynamic consistency by claim-
ing that continuation subtrees are somehow different from decision trees. In
his book that sets out his theory of resolute choice, Ned McClennen (1990)
does something similar. By contrast, I argue that the key consequentialist
axiom that behaviour should be explicable by its consequences should apply
not only for each entire finite decision tree, but also for each continuation
subtree.
Obviously, we can differ over the relative normative appeal of our differing
theories. But there are two methodological considerations that worry me.
The first is that if we are going to treat continuation subtrees as different
from decision trees, why not do the same when considering decision trees
without risk or uncertainty? Then one cannot even use my consequentialist
argument for the existence of a preference ordering. This certainly troubles
me, even if it might not bother Machina or McClennen, since neither hesitates
to assume that there is a preference ordering. Second, faced with any decision
tree, we would have to start worrying about what had preceded it, including
resolutions made in the past. At least we would seem to need a fuller decision
theory that includes scope not only for past resolutions but possibly a richer
domain of consequences to recognize those that emerge from adhering to or
departing from past resolutions.
I am not sure if Mark Machina agrees with my normative theory. But I
definitely accept his theory of non-expected utility maximization as a possibly
useful but refutable description of what many people — perhaps even a large
majority of people — actually choose when faced, for instance, with the
lotteries presented in the well-known paradox due to Allais (1953). Also,
while non-expected utility may describe accurately what people do, especially
in a laboratory, there is still the possibility which Savage discusses in his
Foundations of Statistics that violating EU theory, at least in the context of
the Allais paradox, seems a mistake like paying too much extra for a car that
includes an option such as a fitted radio — in the era of Savage (1954).
PM: I am coming now to another part of your work, which concerns
the extension of standard, static welfare economics and social choice theory
to the uncertainty case. The many problems this extension raises had been
debated in the late 1960s and 1970s by Diamond (1967a, b), Dre`ze (1970),
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Starr (1973) and others before you tackled them in the 1980s, but you put
them more sharply than these early writers, and this was perhaps because
you had the comparative advantage of being a social choice theorist as well
as a welfare economist. To remind the reader, when uncertainty prevails, the
Pareto principle can be applied either to the individuals’ ex ante preferences,
thus implicitly respecting their subjective probabilities and risk attitudes, or
only to their ex post preferences in each given state of the world, thus ignoring
these items entirely. In the ex ante approach, the ex ante Pareto principle
holds, plus the assumption that individuals satisfy SEU, whereas in the ex
post approach, the ex post Pareto principle holds, plus the assumption that
the social observer satisfies SEU. In a 1981 paper and two book chapters
in 1982 and 1983, you emphasize the conflict between the two approaches
(Hammond 1981, 1982, 1983) — a conflict I myself investigated much later
(Mongin 1995), in order to put it into a proper axiomatic framework. You
also express a considered preference for the ex post approach. Your ex post
solution is actually also utilitarian, and it thus provides you with another line
to defend this doctrine. I do not think you have later revisited these claims.
Would you endorse them today in the same way as you did at the time?
PJH: The topic of ex ante versus ex post is yet another to which I
was introduced by Jim Mirrlees while he was supervising me in Oxford. He
ascribed the idea to Peter Diamond. Indeed there is a highly relevant footnote
to Peter’s paper that set out a theory of efficient allocations in a model of the
stock market (Diamond 1967b). The footnote explained that he had chosen
to follow the ex ante approach, while recognizing that the ex post approach
could be an interesting alternative.
I am not quite sure what was the immediate impetus, but eventually I
took up this suggestion of Peter and Jim in the late 1970s. By the way, the ex
post approach could use the individuals’ own risk attitudes, provided these
were judged to be ethically appropriate. It could also use their subjective
probabilities, not indirectly in their subjective expected utilities, but directly
through some other aggregation procedure. The paper by Ross Starr (1973)
had been interested, inter alia, in exploring cases when differing subjective
probabilities would not preclude markets from achieving an ex post efficient
allocation. The Economica paper that you kindly mention (Hammond 1981)
was indeed an attempt to extend some of these results to a more general
setting with many periods, etc.
21
One of the books you mention is Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, with a number of notable contributions
(Sen and Williams 1982). I think I was able to get the title changed from
Beyond Utilitarianism when I suggested to Amartya that at least one, and
eventually several, of the contributors might not want to venture all the way
out there.
Anyway, after these works, my interest in the subject remained essentially
passive for at least 25 years. But then in December 2008, at a seminar
organized by the Paris School of Economics, I gave a talk showing that in a
framework like the insurance model of Malinvaud (1972a, 1973), even if not all
individuals could agree on the associated probabilities of insurable individual
risks, nevertheless ex post Pareto efficiency would still require full risk pooling
provided that agents could all agree that these risks were described by what
de Finetti (1937) described as exchangeable random variables. These results,
I fear, still need to be written up.
Finally, there was a conference in Milan in December 2015 where I had
played a small part in the organization, along with Maurizio Motolese and
Carsten Nielsen whom I had known as Ph.D. students at Stanford. The
theme was “Welfare Evaluation under Subjective Expectations”, with some
emphasis on overconfidence. My talk there was some sort of survey of social
choice theory in such a setting, without finding anything really new to say.
Closely related to these issues is the problem of aggregating subjective
probabilities, and this leads me to share the memory of a seminar by Michael
Bacharach during my two years in Oxford. This seminar introduced me to the
concept of an externally Bayesian procedure for aggregating personal prob-
abilities. A letter to Michael ensued shortly thereafter in which I pointed
out that, instead of taking a weighted arithmetic mean of different individ-
uals’ probabilities, one should instead take logarithms first and consider a
weighted geometric mean. That way you get a rule for which the operations
of aggregation and Bayesian updating commute, which is the property that
defines the externally Bayesian criterion.
PM: I am now venturing into a territory that is less familiar to me, i.e.,
mechanism design, implementation and incentive compatibility. Would you
explain to us how you became interested in this topic and eventually arrived
at the reference paper (Dasgupta et al. 1979) you coauthored with Dasgupta
and Maskin in 1979 on these topics?
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PJH: Again, this part of my work starts with trying to fill in some logical
gaps I found while teaching a master’s course in public economics at Essex.
Now, the efficiency theorems of welfare economics link Pareto efficient al-
locations to the Walrasian equilibrium outcomes of a competitive market
mechanism, provided that one introduces lump-sum wealth redistribution.
Paul Samuelson in his Foundations of Economic Analysis had recognized
that there could be problems in acquiring the information needed to imple-
ment satisfactorily such a redistribution scheme (Samuelson 1947). Actually,
since the distribution of wealth typically affects aggregate consumer demands
and supplies and so market-clearing prices, the redistribution scheme should
really specify how each individual’s wealth depends on prices, as it will when
it is a rule for distributing the profits of firms in a general Arrow–Debreu
economy (Arrow and Debreu 1954, Debreu 1959, Grandmont and McFadden
1972). That said, Diamond and Mirrlees’ results on optimal taxation applied
in a second-best world where there could be distortionary commodity taxes,
but any lump-sum wealth redistribution had to take place through uniform
lump-sum subsidies (or much less plausibly, taxes) that were the same for
everybody, regardless of any individual circumstances. This is the kind of
“imperfect” economy that Mirrlees (1997) discussed in his Nobel Prize lecture
on the “economics of carrots and sticks”.
Indeed, some sort of folk theorem was going around that concerned first-
best optimal allocations in the model of income taxation that had been briefly
explored in Vickrey (1945) before Mirrlees (1971) gave it a much fuller treat-
ment. Assuming that leisure is a normal good, the unique first-best allocation
has all workers consume the same amount, regardless of their skill; workers
whose known skills were greater, however, would be expected to work more.
Such an allocation seems well described by what became the Marxist slo-
gan: “From each according to their ability; to each according to their need!”
(Marx 1875). Yet trying to put this into practice would neglect incentives to
reveal one’s true skill and lead to this description of working in any of the
Communist nations of Eastern Europe prior to 1989: “So long as the bosses
pretend to pay us, we will pretend to work.” Actually, as I learned from a lec-
ture that my colleague Mark Harrison gave on the occasion of the centenary
of the Russian Revolution (Harrison 2017), the Leninist Soviet constitution
already suggested “to each according to their work”.4
4See chapter 5, section 3 of Lenin (1917), as well as Article 12 of the 1936 Constitution
of the USSR.
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During the early 1970s, Leo Hurwicz’s Richard T. Ely lecture to the
American Economic Association, “The Design of Mechanisms for Resource
Allocation”, had appeared in print (Hurwicz 1973). As, of course, had Al-
lan Gibbard’s (1973) paper on strategyproof voting schemes, though that
seemed less relevant to the issues surrounding economic allocations which
interested me at that time. Hurwicz’s paper, despite being largely concerned
with impossibility results, like Gibbard’s, did offer one positive suggestion:
a competitive market mechanism did seem to be strategyproof in a large
economy with many consumers.
In 1977 I had agreed to teach during Stanford’s summer quarter so that
I could attend the summer workshop of the Institute of Mathematical Stud-
ies in the Social Sciences, organized by Mordecai Kurz. So unfortunately I
missed the conference that led to Jean-Jacques Laffont’s volume Aggregation
and Revelation of Preferences (Laffont 1979). But at the Stanford work-
shop I could at least present an early version of what became my paper on
incentives in large economies that characterized strategyproof mechanisms,
including the competitive mechanism (Hammond 1979a). What Roger Gues-
nerie (1981, 1995), in his parallel work, called the “taxation principle” played
a crucial role in this characterization. Smoothness conditions that excluded
competitive mechanisms with redistributive lump-sum transfers were pro-
vided. In an economy with public goods, similar conditions ensured that the
only way to get a strategy-proof mechanism to yield Pareto efficient alloca-
tions required the public goods to be financed by what later, in the 1980s,
became the hated “poll tax” or “community charge” that Mrs. Thatcher in-
troduced as a way of helping to finance local government expenditure. My
paper, however, did point out that such a tax could be difficult to collect.
I should record that Paul Champsaur and Guy Laroque did express some
objections to my treatment of null sets of agents in the result that relied on
smoothness conditions (Champsaur and Laroque 1981, 1982). I hope I may
have answered them in the chapter (Hammond 2011) on competitive market
mechanisms that Arrow, Sen and Suzumura had asked me to write for the
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare they edited.
Around that time, I aspired to follow a precedent that Michael Farrell and
Frank Hahn had set as managing editors of the Review of Economic Studies
when they published symposia on specific research topics — namely, the
June 1962 “Symposium on Production Functions and Economic Growth”,
and the January 1967 “Symposium on Optimal Infinite Programmes”. In
1974 Geoffrey Heal continued this tradition with an extra issue devoted to
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a “Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible Resources”. The subject I
chose for what became the April 1979 issue was incentive compatibility, a
topic for which there were already a number of good papers in the editorial
pipeline.
Meanwhile Eric Maskin had been visiting “our” Cambridge while working
on his Harvard Ph.D. thesis in Applied Mathematics, supervised by Kenneth
Arrow. Partha Dasgupta and I had been discussing some aspects of Eric’s
work with him. An attempt (Dasgupta et al. 1979) to synthesize many of the
results known at that time, and to place them in the context of social choice
theory, seemed something worth including in the symposium. Fortunately,
the referees agreed. They let us get away, however, with one rather glaring
error.
PM: The paper covers so much ground and has such a wealth of formal
results that a slip in it is excusable. What was this error?
PJH: We had a correct result, essentially due to Leo Hurwicz (1972),
showing that in the case of a two-person exchange economy, any strategy-
proof mechanism guaranteeing Pareto efficient exchange would have to be
dictatorial. But then we claimed that the same would hold with more than
two individuals, and referred the reader to Eric’s thesis for a result that was
related, but failed to offer an adequate proof. Not many years later in the
same journal, Mark Satterthwaite and Hugo Sonnenschein came up with a
remarkably simple counter-example, which they were kind enough to conceal
somewhat in their presentation of interesting new results (Satterthwaite and
Sonnenschein 1981). In this counter-example, a third agent’s preferences
could determine which of the first two agents would be allocated the total
endowment in the exchange economy, so neither is a dictator. At least it is
an interesting illustration of what difference it makes to add a third player
to a game with two players.
There is an important lesson that I like to draw from a particular result in
our paper, similar to one which John Ledyard (1978) demonstrated at about
the same time. First let me start with the methodological observation that
the literature on incentive compatibility is intended to deal with situations
where the participants in the mechanism or game have incomplete informa-
tion about each other. In my view, this calls for Harsanyi’s (1967, 1968a,
b) concept of a “Bayesian” equilibrium, rather than the Nash equilibrium
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concept that Hurwicz, Maskin and others were using rather extensively.5
Perhaps Nash equilibrium is appropriate in something like a principal–agent
setting for the very special case where all the agents happen to have com-
plete information about each other, but the principal does not. Anyway, in
general, the outcome of a game of incomplete information will be sensitive
to each player’s beliefs about the preferences and beliefs of other players,
including their beliefs about which strategies the other players will choose.
Indeed, such beliefs and the speculative activity which they engender typi-
cally play a key role in determining prices in financial markets, as well as the
outcome of a first-price sealed bid auction. Yet welfare economists usually
focus only on simple allocation mechanisms, without considering at all how
the allocation generated by agents’ behaviour in the mechanism may depend
on their beliefs. Our simple result showed that the only case where this is
generally justified is when one is using a strategy-proof mechanism. This
may help justify why my subsequent work has largely focused on these.
Roger Guesnerie and I both moved on to consider mechanisms that re-
mained strategy-proof even in the presence of parallel or shadow markets,
where agents could conduct hidden deals on the side. Roger introduced the
idea of dividing up private goods into two classes: first, goods like potatoes,
cigarettes, wine, or drugs that could be exchanged on such shadow markets;
second, goods like electricity, houses, and labour supplied to large firms that
get noticed by tax authorities (Guesnerie 1981, 1995). The “multilateral”
incentive constraints that arise not only imply that pricing schedules have to
be linear, which is not too surprising; in addition, lump-sum redistribution
which does not depend on publicly observable individual characteristics such
as date of birth can be entirely ruled out without any need to assume smooth
preferences. In effect, the possibility of shadow trading places additional con-
straints on strategyproof mechanisms, as suggested by the title of my later
article on “markets as constraints” (Hammond 1987).
Finally, while on this subject of mechanisms and market design, it may
be appropriate to mention Hammond (2017). This paper’s subtitle “Twenty-
Two Steps to Walrasian Equilibrium” evokes some of the practical difficulties
that must be overcome if one is to get competitive markets to work as stan-
dard micro-economic theory says they should, even if one is limited only to
5For notable examples, see Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1994) and Maskin (1999),
as well as several contributions to the Hurwicz Festschrift (Groves et al. 1987).
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spot markets with many traders, whose individual influence over prices is
negligible.
PM: I suppose one could argue that implementation theory provides a
foundation for public economics. At least, this is the area where public eco-
nomics and social choice theory have fruitfully met. Decreasing the abstrac-
tion level, we could now touch on public economics proper and discuss the
contributions you made to it.
PJH: Many of my ideas on public economics up to the late 1980s are
summarized in my “provocative assessment” of theoretical progress in the
subject (Hammond 1990). This was a response to the kind invitation of my
Oxford friend Peter Sinclair while he was an editor of Oxford Economic Pa-
pers. But then, after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Edmond Malinvaud came
to give some Schumann lectures at the European University Institute (EUI),
where I spent a leave of absence from Stanford as a “professore di scienze
economiche” (plural) for the two academic years 1989/90 and 1990/91. Ma-
linvaud’s lectures concerned the then topical subject of suitable programmes
for liberalizing the economies of the Eastern European nations that, up to
1989, had been behind the Iron Curtain.6 These lectures prompted me to
think once again about the possible benefits of markets, especially the gains
from trade and other forms of economic liberalization. This topic had inter-
ested me enough back in 1975 so that, when Murray Kemp invited me down
from Canberra to the University of New South Wales in Sydney in order
to give a lunch-time seminar, rather presumptuously I chose to speak about
“The Gains from Trade in Imperfect Economies”. Meanwhile, I became a
supervisor to Jaume Sempere as he was studying for his Ph.D. at EUI. After
he had had this thesis accepted, we collaborated on three articles discussing
how to convert the potential Pareto gains that Kaldor and Hicks had consid-
ered in their compensation tests into ethically acceptable actual Pareto gains
(Hammond and Sempere 1995, 2006, 2009).
Our first paper, which appeared in the Economic Journal, focused on
the gains from trade. It built on a Journal of International Economics pa-
per by Jean-Michel Grandmont and Daniel McFadden that extended the
two standard textbook examples where trade cannot create any pecuniary
6See http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/23611 for a record dated 1991 of a distin-
guished lecture that Malinvaud gave to the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
at the European University Institute. The title was “Macroeconomic Research and Euro-
pean Policy Formation”.
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externalities in the form of adverse terms-of-trade effects (Grandmont and
McFadden 1972). These examples are: first, an exchange economy where the
status quo is autarky; second, a “small country” whose exports and imports
have no effects on world prices. There was also some discussion of the paper
by Avinash Dixit and Victor Norman (Dixit and Norman 1986). This consid-
ered a Diamond–Mirrlees model of optimal taxation where one could ensure a
Pareto improvement by freezing consumer prices and then using commodity
taxes or subsidies in order to create a gap between consumer and producer
prices that would allow the latter to vary in order to clear markets while also
providing resources to fund a uniform lump-sum subsidy that would benefit
every consumer.
For our second paper in the Journal of Public Economic Theory, we
turned attention to the additional potential Pareto gains which could be
achieved from the free migration of labour. Murray Kemp (1993) had dis-
cussed this earlier, but he treated labour as just another traded good. This
ignores the non-convexities that make themselves all too evident if one tries
to work simultaneously in more than one country. Or, in the example which
Malinvaud presented in his Lectures on Microeconomic Theory in the days
before high-speed trains, if one tries to eat a dinner one evening that is split
between Paris and Lyons (Malinvaud 1969). We were able to overcome these
non-convexities by the usual device of assuming a continuum of consumers,
following the well-known major works (Aumann 1964, 1966; Hildenbrand
1974), as well as papers by Akira Yamazaki and Ali Khan on general equi-
librium theory with non-convex consumption sets and dispersed consumer
characteristics (Yamazaki 1978, 1981; Khan and Yamazaki 1981).
That second paper was written while I was in California. There I was well
aware of Proposition 187 supported by Governor Pete Wilson and passed by
Californian voters in 1994.7 It was intended to deny the access of “illegal”
immigrants to publicly provided services such as schools for their children
and, in the case of the poor, access to emergency healthcare. That prompted
a third paper, published in Economic Theory, that allowed for externalities
subject to congestion. This does strike me as a legitimate cause for con-
cern about immigration in case, as happens too often, especially in the UK
leading up to the Brexit referendum fiasco, the state fails to make adequate
adjustments in the provision of public resources that immigrants and their
7Immediately after passage, its key provisions were challenged in federal district court.
They were declared unconstitutional before having time to take effect.
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families need. This despite the additional tax revenue that immigration often
generates.
Externalities subject to congestion do, of course, make it much harder
to ensure Pareto gains from free migration; indeed, in order to encourage
people to make efficient decisions regarding where to live and work, we found
ourselves analysing residence charges that are uncomfortably close to the
Thatcherite poll taxes that had emerged in my paper on incentives in large
economies (Hammond 1979). Even then Jaume and I were only able to ensure
Pareto gains by assuming that migration would be limited to exchanges of
population which kept fixed any congestion externalities that would have
existed in the status quo allocation, in the absence of any reform. Along with
David Lodge’s amusing novel about an academic exchange of Professors of
English Literature between “Rummidge University” in the English Midlands
and “Euphoric State” on the edge of the San Francisco Bay, this inspired the
“Changing Places” part of the title. It also does much to explain why the
paper became the subject of seminar presentations at both U.C. Berkeley
and the University of Birmingham.
PM: Could we now turn to the vexed topic of cost–benefit analysis (CBA),
another area you contributed to?
PJH: My introduction to it occurred while at Nuffield College, where
there was a regular Friday afternoon seminar organized by Ian Little and
Jim Mirrlees. That seminar concerned issues arising from trying to put into
practice the methods advocated in their Manual published by the OECD
(Little and Mirrlees 1969, 1974). There were the competing Guidelines for
Project Evaluation by Partha Dasgupta, Stephen Marglin, and Amartya Sen
(UNIDO 1972). Indeed, my first encounter with Amartya may have been
when he came to the Nuffield seminar in order to present a talk on their
alternative methodology.8 Also, when I was at the Australian National Uni-
versity (ANU), I found myself gravitating to the Philosophy Department to
attend a seminar on CBA that they had organized. This was most likely as
an initiative of John Passmore, a great figure in Australian philosophy who
in 1974, as I have since discovered, published a book on environmental ethics
(Passmore 1974).
My writing on the subject of CBA began with a contribution to the then
annual AUTE (Association of University Teachers of Economics) conference,
8See also Sen (1972a).
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when it was held in the spring of 1978 at the University of Warwick. The title
of the paper is “Cost–Benefit Analysis as a Planning Procedure” (Hammond
1980).9 The idea was that, properly conducted, a CBA test should be a tool
for identifying projects or policy changes that would improve the allocation
of resources. This is somewhat along the lines of Malinvaud’s “Decentralized
Procedures for Planning” that appeared in a 1967 conference volume that he
co-edited with Michael Bacharach (Malinvaud 1967). Similar ideas arise in
the MDP planning procedure, named after Malinvaud (1971, 1972b) as well
as Dre`ze and de la Valle´e Poussin (1971). Another source of inspiration for
me was a seminar that I heard Peter Warr present while I was at the ANU
(Warr 1977).
A key issue that arises when doing CBA is the choice of shadow prices at
which to evaluate the inputs to and outputs from the project being analysed.
The UNIDO manual largely advocates using consumers’ demand prices. Its
approach focuses ideally on how the project, together with any “balancing
policies” such as financing the project that are needed to allow the economy
as a whole to adjust to it, affect different consumers’ well-being (Hammond
1986). If the project is small, one can use their aggregate willingness to pay,
with suitable welfare weights for different individuals, to see if the benefits
outweigh the costs. Doing this thoroughly, however, even for a project as
small as deepening one village well by the odd metre, is likely to be very
burdensome. Partha Dasgupta, in his published discussion of my paper at
the AUTE conference, was energetic in defending the UNIDO approach, and
in noticing some gaps in my background knowledge.
By contrast, the OECD manual by Little and Mirrlees largely favoured us-
ing producers’ supply prices. In the prominent case of goods that are traded
internationally by a small country facing competitive world markets, these
could be the prices at which those goods cross the national border. Many
non-traded goods, on the other hand, could be priced by looking at input
and output relationships in the national economy. Some decades later, while
preparing my paper “Reassessing the Diamond–Mirrlees Efficiency Theorem”
for the conference whose proceedings appeared in what became the Mirrlees
Festschrift that Gareth Myles and I co-edited, I realized how this approach
based on supply prices could be justified if it was able to identify projects
that would really enhance the economy’s production possibilities (Hammond
9See https://web.stanford.edu/~hammond/CostBenefit1978.pdf for a version
where the scanned pages appear in numerical order.
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2000). Then, provided that the project is accompanied by other suitable pol-
icy measures for distributing the benefits of increased production efficiency
to consumers, it could generate Pareto gains. This proviso, of course, of-
ten fails to be met, as is illustrated by what has been happening over the
last decades to poorer workers who have become the increasingly desperate
victims of globalization.
Looking back almost 40 years, using the demand prices that the UNIDO
approach emphasizes always works in principle provided that one restricts
attention to genuinely small projects, if there are any, where shadow prices
are fixed. Yet using demand prices seems unreasonable in requiring not only
a finely detailed disaggregated analysis to determine the precise distribution
of individual gains and losses, but also a full specification of what “balancing
policy” gets used to re-equilibrate the national economy by, for instance,
providing adequate finance for the project. On the other hand, whereas
the OECD approach based on supply prices surely requires calculations that
should be much easier in practice, it is really only ethically justified if one
has faith that institutions which supplement the project can ensure that its
gains and losses will be appropriately distributed between different individual
consumers.
Finally, there is also the associated topic of welfare measurement. Some
pieces I wrote during the 1980s on approximate measures (Hammond 1984,
1988d) reflected the fact that I was then rather confused. One benefit of
knowing Erwin Diewert, however, was that Wolfgang Eichhorn invited me to
a conference in Karlsruhe. By then I had finally grown to understand and
appreciate the power and intuitive appeal of money metric utility functions,
which are related to but more useful than Hicks’s notions of compensating
and equivalent variation that appear in the better textbooks.
I was also familiar with Dale Jorgenson’s work on measuring social welfare
that had featured in his Presidential Address to the Econometric Society
and other articles (Jorgenson 1990, 1997a, b). This relied on concepts like
equally or optimally distributed income equivalents, as well as hypotheses
about demand behaviour close to allocations that would be reached with
equal or optimal income distributions. Yet in our very unequal societies, it
is hard to know what this behaviour would be. So in Hammond (1994b),
following ideas due to Martin Feldstein (1974) and Harvey Rosen (1976), I
proposed a uniform money metric measure of social welfare. Its construction
depends only at what demand behavior would be near allocations where
all individuals have equal increases to their status quo income, which seems
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much more practical. Also, to support our host Wolfgang Eichhorn in what in
the end was clearly his successful effort to secure the generous funding that
the conference deserved, he asked us to include some discussion of issues
surrounding externalities. In my case I found this relatively easy to do,
though it did raise some associated issues about how to generalize the Slutsky
conditions to deal with marginal willingness to pay for public goods. These
issues, as far as I am aware, still remain unresolved some 25 years later.
PM: Before we are coming to a close and I thank you for a wonderful
treat of ideas and recollections, I would like to put to you a loose, but per-
haps important question. Your career began, and some of your achievements
indeed took place, in what was still the heyday of economic theory. In the
post-war years, neo-classical economics had finally crystallized into elegant
theorems on equilibrium and optimality, and entirely new theories of rational
action with a strong axiomatic tone had just entered stage — game theory,
decision theory, social choice theory, and their dependencies. New formal
tools like convex analysis, combinatorics, linear programming or optimiza-
tion theory, had emerged or become better understood. All this encouraged
the mentors and senior colleagues you mentioned in this interview to expect
further quick progress as well as perhaps a final unification — the expression
in the singular “economic theory” testifies to this hope. You are the heir to
this intellectual tradition, which your life-long work has enriched. But already
before the turn of the century, the economists’ academic interests shifted to-
wards experiments, applications and new disciplinary connections, such as
cognitive psychology and behavioural sciences. Today’s young theorists have
a hard time competing with ambitious millennials who produce more and more
empirical research with shallow theoretical foundations. Do you agree with
this sombre diagnosis? Do you think there is a future in the profession for
the economic theory we discussed in this interview?
PJH: Now you are asking me to do something even more dangerous
than predicting future economic events, which is to predict the progress of
economic thought, especially in the area of normative economic theory which
has been the subject of this interview. Nevertheless, I am ready to admit
that I tend to agree with your diagnosis, though in the end I may disagree
with the assessment that it is sombre.
Probably I should start by confessing to some rather extreme views re-
garding economic methodology, though they are extreme in two opposite
directions, which may be as uncomfortable as it would be for one person to
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try to balance a see-saw by occupying both ends simultaneously. At one end
is descriptive or positive economics, which is concerned with how individu-
als make decisions, and how economic institutions perform, as well as who
gets allocated what in an economic system. Here I am an extremist to the
extent of refusing to accept, at least in the absence of convincing supporting
evidence, the standard neoclassical hypothesis that economic agents behave
rationally.
At the other extreme is theory that is purely normative or prescriptive,
setting out principles that should guide economic policy, or decision-making
more generally. Here I go to the other extreme in saying that the decision-
maker should choose policies and actions that they can defend because they
can be expected to have good consequences. As I claimed in an invited
address to last year’s meeting of the European Society for the History of
Economic Thought whose theme was “rationality”, one should avoid any
unnecessary possibility of creating regrettable consequences. This, by the
way, is intended to recognize that some regret may be necessary because of
our inability to have a complete model of all the consequences that may re-
sult from those decisions that we must make right now. It turns out that
planning to avoid regrettable consequences is equivalent to dynamic consis-
tency. There is some relationship here to Gilboa and Schmeidler’s view that
rationality requires avoiding regret over the axioms one chooses to satisfy;
I have much more concern, however, for the practical consequences of eco-
nomic decisions than for the logical “consequences” (i.e., implications) of
alternative axiom systems (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001; Gilboa 2010, 2015).
Anyway, this kind of rationality based on avoiding regrettable consequences
leads rather directly to subjective expected utility as a decision criterion,
with some modifications that I am still exploring in an attempt to recognize
that any model we use to guide our decision-making involves bounds that
prevent our noticing possibilities whose neglect we may later regret.
When discussing the future of our discipline, we should admit the pos-
sibility of diminishing returns to some kinds of further research. Certainly
young researchers trying to establish themselves in academic economics may
be well advised to focus on better descriptive models. So I welcome progress
in behavioural economics that attempts to improve our understanding of how
real people form their tastes and beliefs, and of how they make decisions,
including in laboratory experiments. Of course, the search for a coherent
theoretical framework is important, as is looking for psychologically realistic
ways of advising people how to make better decisions. Indeed, one reason
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that my move to Warwick in 2007 has proved personally beneficial is that it
created more scope for me to explore some of these topics.
I would like to end, however, with what may be a salutary lesson. One
reaction to the financial meltdown in 2007–8 was that economists had ne-
glected to construct appropriate models that build in some understanding of
what really happens in messy real financial markets.10 The hope seemed to
be that such models could help us predict financial markets better, and per-
haps head off the next crisis. Yet to me, thinking as a normative economist,
this may be fruitless. Instead, rather than trying to model the existing mess
better, we should at least start thinking about how to regulate and even
re-design financial markets so that their behaviour becomes much easier to
understand. Then, perhaps, we can hope to control them well enough to
ward off unnecessary threats of disaster.
Finally, let me conclude this last response by expressing my profound
thanks to you for the wonderfully well-informed and probing questions that
you have asked me. Attempting to answer them has been a most welcome
intellectual challenge.
References
Allais, Maurice (1953) “Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le
risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’e´cole Ame´ricaine” Econo-
metrica 21 (4): 503–546.
Anscombe, Francis J., and Aumann, Robert J. (1963) “A Definition of
Subjective Probability” Annals of Mathematical Statisics 34 (1): 199–
205.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1950) “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare”
Journal of Political Economy 58 (4): 328–346.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951a, 2nd edn. 1963) Social Choice and Individual
Values (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951b) “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice
in Risk-Taking Situations” Econometrica 19 (4): 404–437.
10See especially the papers in Nature by Jean-Philippe Bouchaud (2008) as well as Doyne
Farmer and Duncan Foley (2009).
34
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1959) “Rational Choice Functions and Orderings” Eco-
nomica 26 (102): 121–127.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1977) “Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social
Choice” American Economic Review 67 (1): 219–225.
Arrow, Kenneth J., and Debreu, Ge´rard (1954) “Existence of an Equilibrium
for a Competitive Economy” Econometrica 22 (3): 265–290.
Aumann, Robert J. (1964) “Markets with a Continuum of Traders” Econo-
metrica 32(1): 39–50.
Aumann, Robert J. (1966) “Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium in Mar-
kets with a Continuum of Traders” Econometrica 34(1): 1–17.
Blackorby, Charles, Bossert, Walter, and Donaldson, David (2005) Popula-
tion Issues in Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Blackorby, Charles, Nissen, David, Primont, D. and Russell, R. Robert
(1973) “Consistent Intertemporal Decision Making” Review of Eco-
nomics Studies 40 (2): 239–248.
Bouchaud, Jean-Philippe (2008) “Economics Needs a Scientific Revolution”
Nature 455 (30 October); 1181.
Broome, John (1990) “Fairness” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:
87–101.
Broome, John (1991) Weighing Goods (Oxford: Blackwell).
Champsaur, Paul, and Laroque, Guy (1981) “Fair Allocations in Large
Economies” Journal of Economic Theory 25 (2): 269–282.
Champsaur, Paul, and Laroque, Guy (1982) “A Note on Incentives in Large
Economies” Review of Economic Studies 49 (4): 627–635.
Chichilnisky, Graciela, Hammond, Peter J. and Stern, Nicholas H. (2018)
“Should We Discount the Welfare of Future Generations? Ramsey and
Suppes Versus Koopmans And Arrow” Warwick economics research pa-
pers series (WERPS) (1174), http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/107726/.
35
Dalton, Hugh (1920) “The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes” Eco-
nomic Journal 30: 348–361.
Dasgupta, Partha S., and Hammond, Peter J. (1980) “Fully Progressive
Taxation” Journal of Public Economics 13: 141–154.
Dasgupta, Partha S., Hammond, Peter J., and Maskin, Eric S. (1979) “The
Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on In-
centive Compatibility” Review of Economic Studies 46: 185–216.
D’Aspremont, Claude, and Gevers, Louis (1977) “Equity and the Informa-
tional Basis of Collective Choice” Review of Economic Studies 44 (2):
199–209,
D’Aspremont, Claude, and Hammond, Peter J. (2001) “An Interview with
John C. Harsanyi” Social Choice and Welfare 18: 389–401.
Debreu, Ge´rard (1959) Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Eco-
nomic Equilibrium (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
De Finetti, Bruno (1937) “La pre´vision: ses lois logiques, ses sources sub-
jectives” Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincare´ 7: 1–68.
Deschamps, Robert, and Gevers, Louis (1978) “Leximin and Utilitarian
Rules: A Joint Characterization” Journal of Economic Theory 17(2):
143–163.
Diamond, Peter A. (1967a) “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and
Interpersonal Comparison of Utility: Comment” Journal of Political
Economy 75: 765–766.
Diamond, Peter A. (1967b) “The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equi-
librium Model with Technological Uncertainty” American Economic
Review 57 (4): 759–776.
Diamond, Peter A., and Mirrlees, James A. (1971) “Optimal Taxation and
Public Production I: Production Efficiency” American Economic Re-
view 61 (1): 8–27.
Dixit, Avinash K., and Norman, V. (1986) “Gains from Trade without
Lump-Sum Compensation” Journal of International Economics 21 (1–
2): 99–110.
36
Dre`ze, Jacques (1970) “Market Allocation under Uncertainty” European
Economic Review 2: 133–165.
Dre`ze, Jacques, and de la Valle´e Poussin, Dominique (1971) “A Taˆtonnement
Process for Public Goods” Review of Economic Studies 38(2): 133–150.
Eichhorn, Wolfgang (ed.) (1994) Models and Measurement of Welfare and
Inequality (Berlin: Springer-Verlag).
Farmer, J. Doyne, and Foley, Duncan K. (2009) “The Economy Needs
Agent-Based Modeling” Nature 460(7256): 685–6.
Feldstein, Martin S. (1974) “Distributional Preferences in Public Expendi-
ture Analysis” in H. Hochman and G. Peterson (eds.) Redistribution
through Public Choice (New York: Columbia University Press), pp.
136–161.
Fleurbaey, Marc, and Hammond, Peter J. (2004) “Interpersonally Compa-
rable Utility” in Barbera`, S., Hammond, P.J., and Seidl, C. Handbook
of Utility Theory, Vol. 2: Extensions (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic
Publishers) ch. 21, pp. 1181–1285.
Fleurbaey, Marc, and Maniquet, Fran¸cois (2011) A Theory of Fairness and
Social Welfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Fleurbaey, Marc, and Maniquet, Fran¸cois (2017) “Fairness and Well-being
Measurement” Mathematical Social Sciences 90: 119–126.
Fleurbaey, Marc, and Maniquet, Fran¸cois (2018) “Optimal Income Taxa-
tion Theory and Principles of Fairness” Journal of Economic Literature
56(3): 1029–1079.
Fleurbaey, Marc, and Mongin, Philippe (2005) “The News of the Death of
Welfare Economics Is Greatly Exaggerated” Social Choice and Welfare
25: 381–418.
Fleurbaey, Marc, and Mongin, Philippe (2016) “The Utilitarian Relevance
of the Aggregation Theorem” American Economic Journal: Microeco-
nomics 8 (3): 289–306.
Gibbard, Allan S. (1973) “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General
Result” Econometrica 41: 587–601.
37
Gilboa, Itzhak (2010) “Questions in Decision Theory” Annual Reviews in
Economics 2: 1–19.
Gilboa, Itzhak (2015) “Rationality and the Bayesian Paradigm” Journal of
Economic Methodology 22 (3), 312–334.
Gilboa, Itzhak, and Schmeidler, David (2001) A Theory of Case-Based De-
cisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Graaff, Jan de V. (1957) Theoretical Welfare Economics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press).
Grandmont, Jean-Michel, and McFadden, Daniel (1972) “A Technical Note
on Classical Gains from Trade” Journal of International Economics
2 (2): 109–125.
Groves, Theodore, Radner, Roy, and Reiter, Stanley (1987) Information,
Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid
Hurwicz (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
Guesnerie, Roger (1981) “On Taxation and Incentives: Further Reflections
on the Limits of Redistribution” Discussion Paper No. 89, Sonder-
forschungsbereich 21, University of Bonn.
Guesnerie, Roger (1995) A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Hammond, Peter J. (1973) Consistent Planning and Intertemporal Welfare
Economics (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge).
Hammond, Peter J. (1975a) “Agreeable Plans with Many Capital Goods”
Review of Economic Studies 42: 1–14.
Hammond, Peter J. (1975b) “A Note on Extreme Inequality Aversion” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 11: 465–467.
Hammond, Peter J. (1976a) “Equity, Arrow’s Conditions, and Rawls’ Dif-
ference Principle” Econometrica 44: 793–804.
Hammond, Peter J. (1976b) “Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice”
Review of Economic Studies 43: 159–173.
38
Hammond, Peter J. (1977) “Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice”
Economica 44: 337–350.
Hammond, Peter J. (1979a) “Straightforward Individual Incentive Compat-
ibility in Large Economies” Review of Economic Studies 46: 263–282.
Hammond, Peter J. (1979b) “Equity in Two-Person Situations: Some Con-
sequences” Econometrica 47: 1127–1135.
Hammond, Peter J. (1980) “Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Planning Procedure”
in D.A. Currie and W. Peters (eds.) Contemporary Economic Analysis,
Vol. 2 (Proceedings of the Conference of the Association of University
Teachers of Economics, 1978) (London: Croom-Helm), ch. 8, pp. 221–
250.
Hammond, Peter J. (1981) “Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under
Uncertainty” Economica 48: 235–250.
Hammond, Peter J. (1982) “Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information”
in A.K. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cam-
bridge University Press), ch. 4, pp. 85–102.
Hammond, Peter J. (1983) “Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consis-
tent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty” in P.K. Pat-
tanaik and M. Salles (eds.) Social Choice and Welfare (Amsterdam:
North-Holland), ch. 10, pp. 175–205.
Hammond, Peter J. (1984) “Approximate Measures of Social Welfare and
the Size of Tax Reform” in D. Bo¨s, M. Rose, and C. Seidl (eds.)
Beitra¨ge zur neueren Steuertheorie (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), pp. 95–
115.
Hammond, Peter J. (1986) “Project Evaluation by Potential Tax Reform”
Journal of Public Economics 30: 1–36.
Hammond, Peter J. (1987a) “Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive
Compatibility in Continuum Economies” Review of Economic Studies
54: 399–412.
39
Hammond, Peter J. (1987b) “Social Choice: The Science of the Impossi-
ble?” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of
Economic Policy (Macmillan and New York University Press, ), ch. 1B,
pp. 116–131.
Hammond, Peter J. (1988a) “Consequentialist Foundations for Expected
Utility” Theory and Decision 25: 25–78.
Hammond, Peter J. (1988b) “Consequentialism and the Independence Ax-
iom” in B.R. Munier (ed.) Risk, Decision and Rationality (Proceedings
of the 3rd International Conference on the Foundations and Applica-
tions of Utility, Risk and Decision Theories) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel),
pp. 503–516.
Hammond, Peter J. (1988c) “Consequentialist Demographic Norms and
Parenting Rights” Social Choice and Welfare 5: 127–145.
Hammond, Peter J. (1988d) “Principles for Evaluating Public Sector Pro-
jects” in P. Hare (ed.) Surveys in Public Sector Economics (Oxford:
Basil Backwell), ch. 2, pp. 15–44.
Hammond, Peter J. (1989) “Some Assumptions of Contemporary Neoclassi-
cal Economic Theology” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) Joan Robinson and Mod-
ern Economic Theory (Macmillan, and New York University Press),
ch. 4, pp. 186–257.
Hammond, Peter J. (1990) “Theoretical Progress in Public Economics: A
Provocative Assessment” Oxford Economic Papers 42: 6–33.
Hammond, Peter J. (1991a) “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why
and how they are and should be made” in J. Elster and J.E. Roemer
(eds.) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press), ch. 7, pp. 200–254.
Hammond, Peter J. (1991b) “Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Com-
parisons” Social Choice and Welfare 8: 1–19.
Hammond, Peter J. (1992) “Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler
Proof and Some Ethical Connotations” in R. Selten (ed.) Rational
Interaction: Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag), pp. 305–319.
40
Hammond, Peter J. (1993) “Credible Liberalization: Beyond the three the-
orems of neoclassical welfare economics” in D. Bo¨s (ed.) Economics in
a Changing World, Vol. 3: Public Policy and Economic Organization
(London: Macmillan), ch. 3, pp. 21–39.
Hammond, Peter J. (1994a) “Elementary Non-Archimedean Representa-
tions of Probability for Decision Theory and Games” in P. Humphreys
(ed.) Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. I: Probability and
Probabilistic Causality (Kluwer Academic Publishers), ch. 2, pp. 25–
59.
Hammond, Peter J. (1994b) “Money Metric Measures of Individual and
Social Welfare Allowing for Environmental Externalities” in W. Eich-
horn (ed.) Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality (Berlin:
Springer-Verlag), pp. 694–724.
Hammond, Peter J. (1995) “Social Choice of Individual and Group Rights”
in W.A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, and N. Schofield (eds.) So-
cial Choice, Welfare, and Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), ch. 3, pp. 55–77.
Hammond, Peter J. (1996a) “Consequentialism, Structural Rationality and
Game Theory” in K.J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C.
Schmidt (eds.) The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1996) ch. 2, pp. 25–42.
Hammond, Peter J. (1996b) “Consequentialist Decision Theory and Utili-
tarian Ethics” in F. Farina, F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci (eds.) Ethics, Ra-
tionality, and Economic Behaviour (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 92–
118.
Hammond, Peter J. (1997) “Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as
Models of Rights” in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.) So-
cial Choice Re-examined, Vol. II (London: Macmillan) ch. 11, pp. 82–
95.
Hammond, Peter J. (1998a) “Objective Expected Utility: A Consequential-
ist Perspective” in Barbera`, S., Hammond, P.J., and Seidl, C. (eds.)
Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1: Principles (Boston, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers) ch. 5, pp. 145–211.
41
Hammond, Peter J. (1998b) “Subjective Expected Utility” in Barbera`, S.,
Hammond, P.J., and Seidl, C. Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1: Prin-
ciples (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers) ch. 6, pp. 213–271.
Hammond, Peter J. (1999a) “Subjectively Expected State-Independent Util-
ity on State-Dependent Consequence Domains” in M.J. Machina and
B. Munier (eds.) Beliefs, Interactions, and Preferences in Decision
Making (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic), pp. 7–21.
Hammond, Peter J. (1999b) “Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Proba-
bilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utility” in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey
and B. Skyrms (eds.) The Logic of Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press) ch. 2, pp. 39–66.
Hammond, Peter J. (1999c) “Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in
Decision Theory and Games” Mathematical Social Sciences 38: 139–
156.
Hammond, Peter J. (1999d) “Roberts’ Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Mi-
nor Correction” Working Papers 99021, Stanford University, Depart-
ment of Economics; available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/
stanec/99021.html.
Hammond, Peter J. (2000) “Reassessing the Diamond–Mirrlees Efficiency
Theorem” in P.J. Hammond and G.D. Myles (eds.) Incentives, Organi-
zation, and Public Economics: Papers in Honour of Sir James Mirrlees
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 12, pp. 193–216.
Hammond, Peter J. (2011) “Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social
Choice Procedures” in Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro
Suzumura (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. II (Am-
sterdam: North-Holland), ch. 15, pp. 47–151.
Hammond, Peter J. (2017) “Designing a Strategyproof Spot Market Mech-
anism with Many Traders: Twenty-Two Steps to Walrasian Equilib-
rium” Economic Theory 63 (1); 1–50.
Hammond, Peter J., and Mirrlees, James A. (1973) “Agreeable Plans” in
Mirrlees, J.A., and Stern, N.H. (eds.) Models of Economic Growth
(London: Macmillan), ch. 13, pp. 283–299.
42
Hammond, Peter J., and Sempere, Jaume (1995) “Limits to the Poten-
tial Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies”
Economic Journal 105: 1180–1204.
Hammond, Peter J., and Sempere, Jaume (2006) “Gains from Trade versus
Gains from Migration: What Makes Them So Different?” Journal of
Public Economic Theory 8: 145–170.
Hammond, Peter J., and Sempere, Jaume (2009) “Migration with Local
Public Goods and the Gains from Changing Places” Economic Theory
41, 359–377.
Hare, Richard (1952) The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Hare, Richard (1963) Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Hare, Richard (1981) Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press).
Harrison, Mark (2017) “The Soviet Economy, 1917–1991: Its Life and After-
life” https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/
public/2017_independent_review_preprint.pdf
Harsanyi, John C. (1953) “Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the
theory of risk-taking” Journal of Political Economy 61 (5): 434–435.
Harsanyi, John C. (1955) “Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and in-
terpersonal comparisons of utility” Journal of Political Economy 63
(4): 309–321.
Harsanyi, John C. (1967) “Games with Incomplete Information Played by
‘Bayesian’ Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model” Management Sci-
ence 14 (3): 159–182.
Harsanyi, John C. (1968a) “Games with Incomplete Information Played by
‘Bayesian’ Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points” Management
Science 14 (5): 320–334.
Harsanyi, John C. (1968b) “Games with Incomplete Information Played by
‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the
Game” Management Science 14 (7): 486–502.
43
Harsanyi, John C. (1974) “On Some Problems Arising from Professor Rawls’
Conception of Distributive Justice” Theory and Decision 4(3–4): 325–
344.
Harsanyi, John C. (1976) Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific
Explanation (Dordrecht: Reidel).
Harsanyi, John C. (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium
in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Harsanyi, John C. (1987) “Interpersonal Utility Comparison” In Eatwell,
J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. (eds.) The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics (Macmillan, London).
(Theory and Decision Library) by John C. Harsanyi (2013-10-04) Pa-
perback – 1722
Hurwicz, Leonid (1972) “On Informationally Decentralized Systems” in
McGuire, C. B. and Radner, R. (eds.) Decision and Organization (Am-
sterdam: North Holland).
Hurwicz, Leonid (1973) “The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Alloca-
tion” American Economic Review 63 (2): 1–30.
Hurwicz, Leonid, Maskin, Eric S., and Postlewaite, Andrew (1994) “Fea-
sible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer
Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets” in Ledyard, John
O. (ed.) The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complex-
ity, Efficiency, and Stability: Essays in Honor of Stanley Reiter (New
York: Springer Science + Business Media), ch. 14, pp. 367–433.
Jorgenson, Dale W. (1990) “Aggregate Consumer Behavior and the Mea-
surement of Social Welfare” Econometrica 58: 1007–1040.
Jorgenson, Dale W. (1997a) Welfare, Vol. 1: Aggregate Consumer Behavior
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Jorgenson, Dale W. (1997b) Welfare - Vol. 2: Measuring Social Welfare
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
44
Kaplow, Louis, and Shavell, Steven (2001) “Any Non-welfarist Method of
Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle” Journal of Political
Economy 109 (2): 281–286.
Kaplow, Louis, and Shavell, Steven (2002) Fairness Versus Welfare (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Kaplow, Louis, and Shavell, Steven (2003) “Fairness versus Welfare: Notes
on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice” Journal
of Legal Studies 32: 331–362.
Kemp, Murray C. (1993) “The Welfare Gains from International Migration”
Keio Economic Studies 30 (1): 1–5.
Khan, M. Ali, and Yamazaki, Akira (1981) “On the Cores of Economies
With Indivisible Commodities and a Continuum of Traders” Journal
of Economic Theory 24(2): 218–225.
Kolm, Serge-Christophe (1971, translated 1987) Justice et E´quite´ (Paris:
CEPREMAP); Justice and Equity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Kolm, Serge-Christophe (1994) “The Meaning of ‘Fundamental Preferences’”
Social Choice and Welfare 11 (3): 193–198.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques (ed.) (1979) Aggregation and Revelation of Prefer-
ences (Elsevier Science).
Ledyard, John O. (1978) “Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Informa-
tion” Journal of Economic Theory 18(1): 171–189.
Lenin, Vladimir I. (1917) The State and Revolution.
Lipsey, Richard G., and Lancaster, Kelvin J. (1956) “The General Theory
of Second Best” Review of Economic Studies 24 (1): 11–32.
Little, Ian M.D., and Mirrlees, James A. (1969) Manual of Industrial Project
Analysis for Developing Countries (Paris: OECD Development Cen-
tre).
Little, Ian M.D., and Mirrlees, James A. (1974) Project Appraisal and
Planning for Developing Countries (London: Heinemann Educational
Books).
45
Machina, Mark J. (1989) “Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility
Models of Choice under Uncertainty” Journal of Economic Literature
27 (4): 1622–1668.
Malinvaud, Edmond (1967) “Decentralized Procedures for Planning” in
E. Malinvaud and M.O.L. Bacharach (eds.) Activity Analysis in the
Theory of Growth and Planning (London: Macmillan), ch. 7, pp. 170–
208.
Malinvaud, Edmond (1969, translated 1972) Le¸cons de the´orie microe´cono-
mique (Paris: Dunod); Lectures on Microeconomic Theory (Amster-
dam: North-Holland).
Malinvaud, Edmond (1971) “A Planning Approach to the Public Good
Problem” Swedish Journal of Economics 73(1): 96–112.
Malinvaud, Edmond (1972a) “The Allocation of Individual Risks in Large
Markets” Journal of Economic Theory 4(2): 312–328.
Malinvaud, Edmond (1972b) “Prices for Individual Consumption, Quantity
Indicators for Collective Consumption” Review of Economic Studies
39: 385–405.
Malinvaud, Edmond (1973) “Markets for an Exchange Economy with Indi-
vidual Risks” Econometrica 41(3): 383–410.
Marx, Karl (1875) “Critique of the Gotha Program, Section I”
Maskin, Eric S. (1999) “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality” Review
of Economic Studies 66 (1): 23–38.
McLennen, Edward F. (1990) Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Founda-
tional Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
McLean, Iain, and Hewitt, Fiona (1994) Condorcet: Foundations of Social
Choice and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar)
McLean, Iain, and Urken, Arnold (1995) Classics of Social Choice: Pio-
neering contributions to social choice and voting from Pliny to Lewis
Carroll (University of Michigan Press).
46
Mirrlees, James A. (1971) “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum In-
come Taxation” Review of Economic Studies 38 (2): 175–208.
Mirrlees, James A. (1997) “Information and Incentives: The Economics of
Carrots and Sticks” Economic Journal 107 (444): 1311–1329.
Mirrlees, James A., and Stern, Nicholas H. (eds.) (1974) Models of Eco-
nomic Growth (London: Macmillan).
Mongin, Philippe (1995) “Consistent Bayesian Aggregation” Journal of
Economic Theory 66(2): 313–351.
Mongin, Philippe (2001) “The Impartial Observer Theorem of Social Ethics”
Economics and Philosophy 17: 147–80.
Murakami, Yasusuke (1968) Logic and Social Choice (London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul).
Myerson, Roger (1985) “Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility:
An Introduction” in Hurwicz, L., Schmeidler, D. and Sonnneschein H.
(eds.) Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of
Elisha A. Pazner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 8, pp.
229–259.
Passmore, John (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems
and Western Traditions (New York: Scribner).
Pattanaik, Prasanta K. (1971) Voting and Collective Choice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Pattanaik, Prasanta K. (1968) “Risk, Impersonality, and the Social Welfare
Function” Journal of Political Economy 76 (6): 1152–1169.
Pigou, Arthur C. (1920) The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan).
Rawls, John (1958) “Justice as Fairness” Philosophical Review 67 (2): 164–
194.
Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press).
47
Robbins, Lionel (1938) “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment”
Economic Journal 48 (192): 635–641.
Roberts, Kevin W.S. (1980a) “Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally
Comparable Welfare Levels” Review of Economic Studies 47 (2): 409–
420.
Roberts, Kevin W.S. (1980b) “Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice
Theory” Review of Economic Studies 47 (2): 421–439.
Rosen, Harvey S. (1976) “A Methodology for Evaluating Tax Reform Pro-
posals” Journal of Public Economics 6: 105–122.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1947) Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press).
Satterthwaite, Mark A., and Sonnenschein, Hugo (1981) “Strategy-Proof
Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points” Review of Economic
Studies 48 (4): 587–597.
Savage, Leonard J. (1954) Foundations of Statistics (New York: John Wi-
ley).
Sen, Amartya K. (1970a) Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Fran-
cisco: Holden Day).
Sen, Amartya K. (1970b) “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” Journal
of Political Economy 78 (1): 152–157.
Sen, Amartya K. (1970c) “Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Compa-
rability” Econometrica 38 (3): 393–409.
Sen, Amartya K. (1972a) “Control Areas and Accounting Prices: An Ap-
proach to Economic Evaluation” Economic Journal 82 (325): 486–501.
Sen, Amartya K. (1972b) “Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Compa-
rability: A Correction” Econometrica 40 (5): 959
Sen, Amartya K. (1973) On Economic Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Sen, Amartya K. (1985) Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North-
Holland).
48
Sen, Amartya K., Williams, B. (eds.) (1982) Utilitarianism and Beyond
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Starr, Ross (1973) “OptImal Production and Allocation under Uncertainty”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 81–95.
Strasnick, Steven (1976) “SociaL Choice and the Derivation of Rawls’s Dif-
ference Principle” Journal of Philosophy 73 (4): 85–99.
Strotz, Robert H. (1956) “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility
Maximization” Review of Economic Studies 23(3): 165–180.
Suppes, Patrick C. (1966) “Some Formal Models of Grading Principles”
Synthese 16: 284–306.
UNIDO (1972) Guidelines for Project Evaluation Dasgupta, P., Marglin S.,
and Sen, A.K. (New York: United Nations).
Vickrey, William S. (1945) “Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to
Risk” Econometrica 13: 319–333.
Vickrey, William S. (1960) “Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 74 (4): 507–535.
Vickrey, William S. (1964) Metastatics and Macreconomics (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World).
Von Neumann, John (1928) “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele” Mathe-
matische Annalen 100: 295–320.
Von Neumann, John, and Morgenstern, Oskar (1944) Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Warr, Peter G. (1977) On the Shadow Pricing of Traded Commodities.
Journal of Political Economy 85(4): 865–872.
Yamazaki, Akira (1978) “An Equilibrium Existence Theorem Without Con-
vexity Assumptions” Econometrica 46: 541–555.
Yamazaki, Akira (1981) “Diversified Consumption Characteristics and Con-
ditionally Dispersed Endowment Distribution: Regularizing Effect and
Existence of Equilibria” Econometrica 49: 639–645.
49
